American Review of Canadian Studies, 2013
Vol. 43, No. 1, 123–143, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2013.766806

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Toward a Grand Theory of the Study of Canadian Political Thought

James T. McHugh

University of Akron

One of the most challenging aspects of the study of Canadian political thought is its apparent lack of a clear consensus (perhaps in the form of a "grand theory") that provides it with more structured analytical organization and parameters. This absence can be remedied through an explicit recognition of the competing traditions that have contributed to the mosaic of Canadian philosophical and political beliefs and values. The interplay between liberal and communitarian traditions of Canadian political thought could provide the basis for this sort of model, though other contributions also need to be acknowledged and considered.

Keywords: Canadian political philosophy; Canadian political thought; grand theory; liberalism; communitarianism

Introduction

Canadian political thought is a challenging field of study. One of its most challenging aspects, especially from the perspective of a social scientist (and, as a field of political science, political thought must remain open to that sort of scrutiny), is its apparent lack of a clear consensus on identifying parameters that allow it to be studied and assessed in a more systematic way. From the perspective of teaching a course on this field, Canadian political thought appears to lack a "grand theory" that can tie its disparate contributions together. That absence may not be a critical one (and humanists may well dispute its significance) but it does make the task of promoting and applying this field less attractive and more challenging than it might need to be.

This absence can be remedied—not by assigning a definitive cultural identity to this multidimensional society but through a more explicit recognition of the competing traditions of political thought that have contributed to the mosaic of Canadian philosophical and political beliefs and values. Rather than earlier attempts to characterize Canadian political thought as a homogeneous "x" or as heterogeneously encompassing "a through w," it may be more useful to generalize it (as theories do) as an ongoing interaction of competing traditions "y and z" while admitting (as generalizations do) the presence of exceptions and other normative variations. The particular content of "y" and "z" could be liberal and communitarian traditions of Canadian liberal democratic thought (similar to the competition between liberal and republican traditions within American liberal democracy[1]) or it can assume some other specific form. The more meaningful basis for a "grand theory" of Canadian political thought is the actual model of competing traditions that can provide a conceptual focus for an otherwise disparate field.

Rationale for a 'grand theory'

This essay is more intent upon defending the advantage of the "grand theory" approach than it is upon imposing a particular version of that approach as a necessarily superior one. It will not, ultimately, insist upon the correctness of a particular theory but, instead, upon the superiority of theories that present this field of study within a particular set of parameters. This goal will be undertaken with a strong appreciation of its potential limitations and criticisms. The reference to a paradigmatic "grand theory," especially within the social sciences and humanities, has been subject to understandable controversy. Its revival has been lauded for restoring a sense of theoretical perspective to the study of society and politics.[2] It also has been criticized for its perceived tendency toward artificiality and its attempt to undermine nuance by compelling ideas to fit within a predetermined structure.[3]

Admittedly, an overarching theory of this nature is not absolutely necessary for meaningful scholarship in political thought, including in terms of Canada. But a sense of greater consistency and coherence can be gained from approaching this field in this way—a position that is consistent with general discussions on the proper role of critical theory in modern thought.[4] In that spirit, this article will suggest different potential versions that such a "grand theory" could take for the purpose of approaching Canadian political thought within the parameters of broad terms of reference that can assist in achieving such a greater coherence. The one constant feature that will be recommended in this respect will be the idea that any such theories should provide an overarching framework for the evaluation of Canadian political thought and that the use of a dichotomy will be especially useful for this purpose. *Therefore, treating specific examples and strains of political thought in Canada as fitting within a dichotomous pattern can be especially useful for identifying this category of political thought as being identifiably Canadian.* Describing such an approach as being consistent with "grand theory" may verge, of course, upon hyperbole. Nonetheless, it may prove to be a useful hyperbole.

Grand theory antecedents

It would be misleading and inaccurate to claim that Canadian political thought has never been approached in this manner. Certainly, the seminal studies of Louis Hartz, Seymour Martin Lipset, Kenneth MacRae, Gad Horowitz, and Denis Monière offered "grand" theoretical explanations of Canadian ideological development and values, especially during the 1960s and 1970s.[5] Other notable scholars, such as George Grant, previously had offered a similar perspective on Canada as an (at least potentially) ideologically coherent and consistent nation.[6] However, the perceived inadequacies of these attempts and the strong critiques of sweeping conclusions of many of them[7] appear to have contributed to a general abandonment of the development of a grand theory of Canadian thought during the past several decades. Arguably, that absence has not been met with an attempt to replace it, resulting in a field that often appears to lack a clear direction and fails to make as strong a contribution as it might to the overall discourse of the social sciences in relation to the study of Canada.

Therefore, despite these previous efforts, Canadian political thought frequently has appeared to lack an overarching framework to structure its analysis.[8] This general absence often has encouraged texts within this field that are focused more upon relatively parochial subjects than upon a broad overview of the field in relation to the country and its political system as a whole.[9] But even political thought texts that have addressed the broader Canadian context often have been organized in terms of more or less consistent topics that,

while being relevant to Canadian society and political life, do not ultimately provide an overriding definition of the overall meaning of a Canadian political thought.[10] Additionally, other texts have taken the form of broad surveys that, while including excellent examples of scholarship and commentary, can appear to be little more than collections that are bound together because these authors are all Canadian and/or writing within the context of Canadian society and politics.[11] This absence of an overarching framework for the study of Canadian political thought generally has not been expressly noted by scholars[12] but that indifference does not indicate, necessarily, that such an analytical structure is superfluous. Indeed, the lack of an overarching approach to this area arguably results in a haphazard exploration of the historical and current significance of Canada's political ideas and values. More recent attempts to examine Canadian thought in a more comprehensive way have explicitly addressed this problem:

> The Canadian civic philosophy is one that articulates a way of life and philosophy of pluralism within a framework of individual rights. While preoccupied with questions of nationality, it is not a nationalistic philosophy but one that recognizes the equality of nationalities, cultures, and ethnicities from the standpoint of public policy.[13]

In this sense, the study of Canadian political thought often appears to be a series of ideas in search of a comprehensive "national story" to bind them together with a sense of analytical order.[14] Of course, several Canadian political philosophers and related scholars have offered such a story and proposed that their particular version is *the* definitive explanation of Canadian beliefs, values, culture, and the society and political system produced by them. The problem is that these authorities frequently disagree with each other on the precise Canadian "story" that ought to be the dominant and comprehensively explanatory one. This struggle certainly has not been unique to Canada; it also has affected the study of American political thought—in a manner that also will be explained. It is for that reason that the development of a more coherent template for this area of study ought to be grafted upon it. In that spirit, a proposal is being offered that would present Canadian political thought as an ongoing, dichotomous competition between two particularly prominent interpretations of liberal democracy: classic liberal and communitarian.

Traditional approaches and ideological identities

Classic assessments of Canadian politics have offered different approaches to understanding Canada on a foundational level, frequently making reference to communitarian and liberal traditions as defined by seminal political philosophers[15] and more current theorists.[16] In relation to Canadian political thought and culture, some authors have emphasized the importance of the elite/mass dichotomy, as in one account that makes political culture subservient to the exercise of power by a "confraternity of power" whose interests, rather than broader ideals, are the actual source of broadly held political values.[17] Other authors have emphasized a class analysis that subsumes, more starkly, the role of political culture and other social and political institutions to the larger dynamic of class struggle and dominance.[18] Nonetheless, the importance of identifying and applying the concept of an identifiable tradition of political thought to Canada remains an important intellectual and practical focus within this notable literature.[19] Again, a greater appreciation of the true relevance of Canada to its tradition of political thought might be strengthened greatly by the imposition of a broad and overarching normative framework that could facilitate theoretical comparisons and evaluations.

This assessment has led to attempts to reconcile collective and individual values that appear to coexist within Canadian social and political thought. Charles Taylor has made a particular effort to explain this juxtaposition:

> A society with strong collective goals can be liberal on this view, provided that it is also capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common goals; and provided that it can provide adequate safeguards for fundamental rights. There will undoubtedly be tensions and difficulties in pursuing these objectives together but such a pursuit is not impossible and the problems are not in principle greater than those encountered by any liberal society that has to combine, for example, liberty and equality, or prosperity and justice.[20]

Taylor has emphasized the failure of liberal individualism to account for the social development of persons within society. His communitarian critique of liberalism is, therefore, described by him as "a somewhat more complex and many-stranded version of liberalism."[21] His emphasis upon themes of identity and culture (including within the context of multiculturalism) have indicated an attempt to reconcile individual and collectivist principles as part of a broadly defined liberal tradition, especially within the context of Canadian politics and society.[22] Therefore, concepts such as collective rights are not, necessarily, in conflict with essential liberal precepts (including individual rights) but different and mutually valid approaches toward an interpretation and application of that ideological tradition.[23]

A similar attempt to reconcile individualist and collectivist tendencies within Canadian political philosophy has been a particularly notable emphasis of the writings of Will Kymlicka. His focus upon multiculturalism has included a communitarian promotion of "group rights."[24] However, he often seeks to reconcile this collective emphasis with liberal ideals of freedom (including individual rights) and the capacity of liberal individualism to promote social identity.[25] Furthermore, he also has sought to reconcile the traditional liberal role of the neutral state with the role of the community in directing social goals and identities, even while acknowledging liberal limitations in that respect.[26] That desire is expressed within the first sentences of one of his most important books: "Liberalism, as a political philosophy, is often viewed as being primarily concerned with the relationship between the individual and the state and with limiting state intrusions on the liberties of citizens. But, implicitly or explicitly, liberalism also contains a broader account of the relationship between the individual and society—and, in particular, of the individual's membership in a community and a culture."[27]

Taylor and Kymlicka are indicative of a persistent pattern within the study of Canadian political thought. The attempt to articulate a comprehensive understanding of this tradition typically has resulted in contradictory and, even, confusing assessments of ideological values. Those contradictions are particularly evident in terms of the simultaneous existence of values indicative of individual and collective preferences and tensions within Canadian society and politics. The result generally has been the presentation of a field of study that appears to lack a sense of an overarching framework and frequently is presented in a seemingly *ad hoc* manner. This difficulty is explicitly recognized by scholars of Canadian thought who have attempted to resolve it and the variety of Canadian public policy issues that are reflected by it:

> In coming to terms with these issues, Canadian political culture historically has tended toward a spirit of compromise that would reconcile values that on their surface appear fundamentally antithetical. Canadians have in large part opted for a mixed bag of political values, including principles of liberal individualism alongside, and in uneasy tension with, values of a more

> collectivist sort. A national philosophy that prefers a spirit of compromise and *rapprochement* potentially demonstrates virtues of civility and reasonableness frequently less prevalent in nations governed in a more principled or "ideological" fashion, yet it is not without important shortcomings as well. It is with both these virtues and shortcomings in view that a philosophical articulation of the principles implicit to the Canadian way of life would be most profitable. A philosophical articulation of that way of life must give expression to the values and principles inherent to its practices as well as provide a principled critique of the manner in which they are carried into practice.[28]

Like other Western industrialized societies, Canada is dominated by a liberal democratic tradition. However, liberal democracy is a broad and malleable ideological tradition that embraces numerous variations in terms of specific values and interpretations.[29] An analysis of political thought that focuses upon a particular industrial society generally seeks to assess the nature of its liberal democratic traditions in terms of both the influence of national culture and identity and its ideological variations (sometimes as influenced by other ideological traditions) that are particularly prominent and, thus, especially influence its institutions and policies.[30] This sort of analysis of Canada has proven to be challenging: while it is acknowledged to be a liberal democracy, a consensus on its more precise features or signature has been elusive.[31]

The problem is that the attempt to find an overarching ideological label for assessing Canadian political thought has been frustrated by the tensions between individualist and collectivist values that reflect competing variations of liberal democratic thought within the country's social and political development. Therefore, rather than attempting to provide an explanation that reconciles these differences, it would be more productive to accept Canada's development in this area as the product of a dichotomous relationship between two parallel and, often, competing liberal democratic traditions: one that is more consistent with a classic liberal heritage and another one that is more communitarian in nature.[32] That sort of analysis could provide a more coherent framework for assessing the various influences and analytical contributions in the development of Canadian political thought as a distinctive field of study.

The American example

Scholarship relating to political thought in the US developed such a framework as the result of the loss of a former consensus that Lockean values have dominated the development of that country's political values. American ideological development was perceived to have been derived, primarily if not exclusively, from classic liberal values that inspired the American Revolution. This consensus had been particularly significant because of its role within the judicial pronouncements of "originalists" and other adherents of the interpretivist tradition of American constitutional jurisprudence who have contributed to an intellectual struggle to define the foundations of American political culture.[33] This seminal event has provided a dramatic defining moment that serves as such a strong focal point (for both historians and political theorists) that subsequent developments in American history and political thought typically have been related back to it.[34]

Consequently, the origins of American political thought conventionally had been traced to the classic liberal tradition associated with the writings of John Locke.[35] Therefore, the dominance of values that stress individual liberty (as opposed to values that stress "civic virtue" and the will of the community) had been accepted as a prevailing interpretation of a relatively homogeneous American polity.[36] However, that image has been challenged and, consequently, a scholarly debate has ensued regarding the identity of the dominant

ideological interpretation of American political thought. Several scholars have argued that republican, rather than a classic liberal, tradition should be identified as the more prominent influence in the background and development of American political thought.[37] The influence of philosophers such as Michael Harrington, Algernon Sydney, John Trenchard, and Thomas Gordon were cited as more significant influences upon this development than Locke. Therefore, republican principles of "civic virtue," "civic duty," and "virtual representation," entailing greater positive participation in, and from, government than classic liberal thought (with its emphasis upon limited government and individual rights and freedom) were emphasized as being prominent features of American politics, constitutionalism, and, ultimately, social progress.[38] Meanwhile, scholars who defend the Lockean liberal position have responded in kind—often very persuasively.[39]

Like the perceived conflict between individualist and collectivist values and orientations within Canadian political thought and culture, the debate between liberal and republican interpretations of the American ideological tradition undermined potentially homogeneous assumptions concerning American culture and values. Nonetheless, the desire to define American politics and society in terms of such a single, dominant ideological interpretation (beyond the Marxist approach[40]) persisted and, with that persistence, methods that proffered a unified cultural explanation also emerged as part of a broader trend of assigning consistent interpretations to these sorts of analyses.[41] One of the most influential of these constructs was the "fragment theory" regarding "new" societies of Louis Hartz.

New World societies resulted, Hartz argued, from the colonization of particular, culturally homogeneous groups who infused their values into the economic and political practices and institutions of their "new" societies. This process resulted, according to Hartz, in the emergence of a dominant ideological consensus within these societies. The dominant American ideology, according to Hartz, was a libertarian liberalism that reflected the experiences and beliefs of seventeenth century English dissenters and entrepreneurs who fled the economic restrictions and political and religious oppression of their former society.[42]

The Hartzian model was applied to Canada, especially through the work of Kenneth McRae and, later, Gad Horowitz. McRae and Horowitz applied it to an image of a Canadian political culture that was distinct from a perception of the neighboring presence of the US. It divided Canadian political thought into distinct Anglophone and Francophone components. The Anglophone component identified a less individualistic, more class conscious, and more stratified Canadian political culture than its liberal (and, arguably, libertarian[43]) neighbor to the South. The Francophone component identified an allegedly quasi-feudal, hierarchical society that reflected the pre-revolutionary values of sixteenth century France. The model was appealing because it was so simple and comprehensive, while broad historical evidence simultaneously appeared to support its equally broad conclusions.[44]

This model, however, sought to associate the development of Canadian political thought with the development of American thought by attributing both of them to parallel defining "moments" that were historically linked. The American "moment," as previously noted, was the American Revolution, from which event the country's political institutions emerged. The Anglophone Canadian "moment" became the migration of Tory Loyalists from the US, following their post-revolutionary ejection. This focal point of the historical development of Canadian political thought would prove to be inadequate for interpreting the dynamic nature of Canada's cultural development, especially during the late twentieth century.[45] Indeed, this approach to historical identification and theoretical explanation

would prove to be too simple for a meaningful appraisal of the political thought of both societies but, especially, for Canada.

Canadian exceptionalism

Subsequent Canadian political theorists attempted to confirm this dominant difference of Canadian political thought by exploring the alleged nature of its less individualistic, and even less liberal, social, economic, and political norms. An influential early scholar who sought to affirm this image was George Grant. His book, *Lament for a Nation*, encouraged (arguably from a classic conservative perspective, consistent with the "tory touch" as described by McRae[46]) a defense of the Anglophone Canadian nation from the *laissez-faire* dominance of corporate America. This thesis is significant because it reveals two themes that have resonated among other Canadian writers, including political theorists: the promotion of a vague sense that Canada *must* be defined as both culturally and politically different, somehow, from the US; and the belief that this difference must revolve around a rejection of a liberal individualism that is interpreted, correctly or not, as a dominant trait of American politics and society.[47]

That approach reflected a desire to portray Canada as being influenced by classical conservative forces and their values, including ones described by seminal authorities[48] and more current critics.[49] Gad Horowitz offered this perspective as a way to explain the easier acceptance of socialism in Canada which, like classical conservatism (as opposed to the classical liberalism that often has been inappropriately labeled "conservative"[50]) subordinates individual identity to broader, collective identities and goals.[51] Seymour Martin Lipset echoed that theme in his cross-cultural analysis of Canada and the US. His empirical surveys led him to conclude that Canada represents a more deferential, class-conscious and conformist polity than its more strongly individualistic southern neighbor.[52] Lipset later acknowledged, however, that institutional (especially parliamentary) factors may be more responsible for this economic development than purely ideological explanations can provide.[53]

These efforts are indicative of a tendency toward an emphasis upon identifying a dominant ideological tradition that definitively defines the Canadian character. The problem with that trend is its tendency to treat that tradition as a "trump"[54] over other contributory traditions. That trend has led to a further tendency for political theorists to ascribe the values reflected by the political system solely in terms of that dominant tradition, thus interpreting evidence of conflicting values as aberrations or in ways that serve to confirm the influence of that dominant tradition.

An emphasis upon the communitarian influence upon Canada has become a particularly significant manifestation of this tendency. It has been employed to explain and promote a distinctive Canadian character, especially in comparison with the US. It has been used to characterize Canadian multiculturalism (as distinct from an American "melting pot"),[55] Canadian social programs,[56] and inspirations for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[57] It has posed a definitive identity for the country, drawing upon the Iroquois word (*Kanata*, loosely translated as "a community of communities")[58] that formed the basis for the eventual name of the country. Therefore, its advocates have lauded its role in promoting the cooperative process of democratic engagement *over* the atomistic tradition of individual civil rights and liberties as *the* appropriate guiding and interpretive source of ideas for the Canadian polity.[59]

However, this tendency can result in ideological identifications that ignore alternative influences. The identification of a so-called "collective rights" tradition within Canadian

constitutionalism offers an example of this development. This institutional identification is based upon a belief that the rights of groups, exercised *as* groups (such as labor unions) should supersede individual rights within Canada.[60] Clauses of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that have been identified as indicative of collective rights include section 15,[61] which deals with affirmative action, section 27, which addresses the multicultural character of Canada,[62] and Section 33 (the "notwithstanding" clause), which permits legislative override of certain civil rights and liberties.[63] However, the default assumption that these provisions reflect communitarian values frequently neglects potential liberal interpretations of these same guarantees. The possibility that liberal individualist interpretations may have validity in this area has been conceded by ardent supporters of this concept:

> There is an increasing recognition, however, that this familiar debate obscures as much as it reveals. In particular, it does not help us grapple with the normative issues raised by ethnocultural conflicts. For many of the claims raised by ethnocultural groups seem to fall on the 'individual' side of the ledger. For example, the right to use one's mother tongue in the courts is a right exercised by individuals, as is the right to be exempted from legislative or administrative requirements which conflict with one's religious beliefs. Conversely, many of the most familiar features of a liberal-democratic order seem to fall on the "collective" side of the ledger. . . . Even the rights to freedom of the press and assembly, or the right to a jury trial, have important "collective" elements.[64]

In other words, a liberal interpretation of these concepts and institutions also is plausible. Therefore, it can be argued that allusions to collective rights really are expressions of individual rights under a collective label.[65] That tendency also has been noted in relation to this concept as applied to Quebec, especially in terms of individual language rights that are designated as "collective" because of their additional policy purposes.[66] This attempt to construct a communitarian-based constitutional tradition has merit but it also often attempts to diminish or ignore evidence of those liberal values and influences that have been embraced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[67]

Hegemonic explanations

The difficulty is that much of the scholarship on Canadian political thought is presented as an either/or proposition: either Canada is a democratic society that is dominated by classic liberal values, or it is a society that is dominated by communitarian values. The broader idea that it is a democratic society to which competing traditions contribute respective and valid interpretations often is not as readily conceded. Therefore, it may be more productive to argue not only that both classic liberal and communitarian influences contribute to the ongoing development of Canadian politics and society but also, and in a grander sense, the history and current development of Canadian political thought can be characterized as an ongoing interaction of these competing traditions. Examples of that dualism can be relatively easy to identify. Historical debates regarding economic reciprocity reflect a strong current of *laissez-faire* economic values within Canada, while strong social programs reflect support for its most vulnerable groups and the general welfare of the Canadian community.[68] Even the right to strike has been defended, within Canada, as both a collective right and as an individual freedom of association.[69]

Yet a tendency to assign dominant or, even, monolithic explanations of Canadian political thought to the country's institutions and behavior remains pervasive and contentious. That tendency can be observed in terms of cultural comparisons between Canada and the US. As a result, claims that Canada's early development constituted a singular reaction

against developments within the US occasionally have been criticized as being too simple and, perhaps, forced.[70] Indeed, it can be demonstrated, instead, that many early Canadian colonists shared the dissenting perspectives of their American counterparts. The United Empire Loyalists arguably were not as different, ideologically, from the American revolutionaries as some historians uncritically have assumed. Their differences often were motivated by specific economic or political considerations, rather than more consistently held ideological motives. They could disagree with the institutional and strategic goals of the American Revolution, while sharing many of the same objections to British interference with certain economic and political liberties.[71]

Many people in Great Britain shared the ideological vision of the American colonists, while remaining loyal to British political institutions; many Loyalists could be characterized in the same manner. The Upper Canada Rebellion reflected many political demands that were based upon traditional liberal beliefs, especially regarding economic and political freedom. The concept of political deference to imperial authority can be explained in terms other than classical conservative adherence to order and stability. Fears regarding American invasion may have become increasingly elite-motivated, especially after the Anglo-American War of 1812, while a variety of economic considerations may have provided a strong motivation for maintaining imperial connections.[72] Therefore, the reference to peace, order, and good government within the Canada Constitution Act of 1867 may reflect nothing more than an expression of the liberal "harm principle" that was advocated by John Stuart Mill.[73]

It is tempting to interpret such a passage, broadly, but it needs to be appreciated within the context of the document, and the constitutional institutions that it established, as a whole.[74] That phrase should not, for example, be treated automatically as an ideological companion to the French constitutional adherence to the values of "*liberté, egalité, fraternité*."[75] Likewise, it should not be contrasted too strongly with the reference to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" that is found within the American Declaration of Independence, since that document provided a rationale for rebellion and not, necessarily, a plan of government.[76] The actual shaping of the Canadian polity offers the most appropriate source for ideological judgment in that respect.

Twentieth century developments, as well as increased contact and cooperation with the US, allowed classical liberal values to permeate Canadian society. Increased global trade has strengthened free-market sympathies. Meanwhile, collectivist sentiments often arose in opposition to perceived inequities or other problems associated with those liberal market principles. Anti-capitalist trends in places such as Saskatchewan and Alberta arguably were not so different from agrarian movements in the US (especially during the Progressive era) for agrarian and single sector economic movements of a collectivist nature were often, like in the US, demographically and regionally isolated.[77] The global human rights tradition that has proved to be inspirational within Canada has been informed by a greater appreciation of various value systems (including liberal and communitarian ones) that have opposed the historic legacy of totalitarian excesses.[78] During that same post-war period, the Trudeau government demonstrated a strong endorsement of traditional liberal values, even as Canadian sympathies for promoting the communal image of Canada increased.[79]

The virtue of a dichotomous approach

Canadian political thought should be understood in terms of a similar interplay of ideological and cultural values. The essence of this interaction should make reference to the complimentary and conflicting goals of liberal *and* democratic values within the broad

ideological tradition of liberal democracy. This competition arguably occurs within many, if not most, liberal democratic societies.[80] The American version of this competition previously has been described as a struggle for dominance between desires for liberal freedom and republican civic virtue. The British version of this competition has been described as the constraining of liberal values between classical conservative and socialist tendencies.[81] French history is rife with examples of conflict between these values, especially in terms of the cyclical struggle between efficient and democratic government.[82] Japanese concerns regarding the balance between modern liberal and traditional Taoist values offer a similar example of this sort of internal struggle and cooperation within its liberal democratic system.[83]

This relationship seeks to reconcile an ongoing tension within liberal democratic societies between a desire for individual freedom and the pursuit of majoritarian policy goals. But these goals are not mutually exclusive. Liberals do not object, necessarily, to policies that may impose some reasonable limits upon individual persons. They *do*, however, object to collective policies that intrude upon individual freedom, provided they do not seek unfairly to burden or discriminate against a minority or particular persons. Communitarians do not object, necessarily, to the concept of individual rights and liberties. They *do*, however, tend to object to the concept of "inalienable" rights that are claimed to be self-generating and completely beyond the power of society to define or alter. Instead, they frequently support rights and liberties, provided that they are created as part of a broad consensus of a polity.[84] Many American liberals and republicans may be motivated by similar differences of interpretation.

Canadian political thought (and, perhaps, the political thought of most liberal democratic societies) arguably should be identified and analyzed in terms of this sort of dueling ideological tradition. Such an approach could provide a basis for more useful theoretical comparisons. It could provide more analytical consistency and, even, scholarly rigor for an area of study that often has been haphazard and subject to piecemeal treatment. However, the desire to emphasize a dominant strain within a society's tradition of political thought also could be understood in terms of the political and cultural goals of nationalism. National identity often is defined or reinforced in terms of distinctive and shared values. American national identity has been understood in terms of concepts such as freedom, opportunity, entrepreneurship, merit, property, and family that Americans often claim to embrace more strongly than other societies, including liberal democratic ones. A Canadian identity that is based upon shared values also seeks to contrast itself with other societies—especially its dominant neighbor.[85]

As previously discussed, American national identity historically had been perceived as being uniformly liberal, particularly in the tradition of John Locke. Therefore, proponents of the recognition of a distinct Canadian national identity often have emphasized themes of collective goals and responsibility, deference to the will of the democratic sovereign, the promotion of group identity and aspirations, and the concept of collective, as opposed to individual, rights and liberties as a stark contrast to this perceive American image. This desire to establish national identity in terms of rejecting a particular set of values can be described as "negative nationalism": it is negative because it first seeks to establish that it is not American; only after it has identified the thing that it is not does it seek to clarify its actual identity.[86] Therefore, this approach to national identity often lacks precision or coherence. It gropes for an alternative, rather than being motivated by it.[87]

The reality is, ultimately, more complex. Canada experiences competing ideological interpretations—an experience that it probably shares with many liberal democratic societies. Similar contradictions have been noted in terms of Canadian attitudes and approaches

toward federalism.[88] This conflict may be the result of a contradictory desire, within liberal democracy, to pursue both the goals of the democratic majority and the rights and interests of the individual person.

A dialectical 'grand theory'

Thus this discussion returns to the suggestion that the study of Canadian political thought could benefit from a "grand theory" analysis. One model that might be particularly appropriate in this respect is the dialectic. This model interprets critical arguments and perspectives in terms of the initial dominance of an overarching position. As applied to political beliefs and values, this model posits an initially dominant belief system as the stimulus for an opposing set of values that will rise to challenge it. The pervasive system, or "thesis," provides the source of its own contradiction, which develops into the "antithesis." The conflict between the thesis and the antithesis eventually produces a "synthesis" of these contradictory ideas, resulting in the emergence of new dominant "thesis." This new "thesis," in turn, eventually becomes challenged by another "antithesis," and the progressive cycle of history is renewed.[89]

The dialectic could be applied to political thought in various ways, including in terms of the conflict between individualist and collectivist interpretations of liberal democracy that have occurred, and continue to occur, within many societies.[90] This observation may undermine the assumptions that Francis Fukuyama introduced when he asserted that history (as understood in terms of a pattern of fundamental global conflict) had ended with the victory of liberal democratic political and economic values following the end of the Cold War.[91] More importantly, this possible interpretation of collectivist and individualist competition within liberal democratic societies might provide an analytical model that would make the study of political thought more systematic, consistent, and easier to examine as part of a broad overview, rather than as a string of isolated theories and events. This development could be useful for the analysis of many countries and regions, in addition to Canada. It could reemphasize the pivotal role of political theory and other normative fields within the social sciences, in general, and political science, in particular.

It might be useful, therefore, to distinguish clearly the "thesis" from the "antithesis" within Canada as a guide to the sort of analysis that could be invoked within this theoretical construct. It has already been asserted that the historical development of Canadian society and its political institutions reflects a liberal democratic influence that has been prompted by libertarian (including *laissez-faire* economic and civil libertarian) interpretations of that tradition. This "thesis" has experienced the opposition of protectionism, language cleavages, and a resistance to a regime of rights and liberties throughout Canadian history, which reflects the "antithetical" concerns of a democratic community regarding the limitations of liberalism in this respect. Perhaps, as an example, the patriation of the Canadian Constitution and the inclusion of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms within could be interpreted an example of a "synthesis" of these philosophical forces. In that context, the Charter could be interpreted as a reconciliation of liberal values (as expressed within the Charter's guarantees of rights and liberties) with communitarian aspirations such as the Charter's formal promotion of multiculturalism, affirmative action, linguistic interests, and other so-called "group rights."[92]

French–Canadian thought

The philosophical experience of Quebec, Acadia, and other francophone communities within Canada is a major dimension of this overall theme that is often, unfortunately,

overlooked. In addition to Quebec nationalism, assumptions relating to the influence of continental European thought (such as a communitarian strain associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau) have often dominated this dimension.[93] It is a dimension that ought to be considered beyond the case of Quebec,[94] although that focus is understandable, especially considering the dynamics of Quebec nationalism and the values reflected by events such as *la Revolution tranquille*.[95]

Thus the creation of a broader and systematic theoretical overview might make it possible to include Quebec within a single analysis of Canadian political thought. Ironically, Quebec political thought has provided a more coherent pattern of analysis within this field. Denis Monière offers an excellent example of this sort of assessment. Monière has characterized Quebec's ideological history in terms of an evolution that resulted in a competition between traditional, collectivist beliefs and values and individualistic liberal beliefs and values. He associated those collectivist beliefs with the "ultramontantist" thought of Quebec's Catholic elite. He contrasted this approach with the emerging dominance of liberal beliefs that had a wider, and more lasting, appeal.[96] This approach undermines the Hartzian paradigm of Kenneth McRae and other theorists who have identified Quebec as some sort of feudal fragment of pre-liberal France for it acknowledges the fact that Quebec society is liberal democratic, even if its nationalist aspirations may place it at odds with the rest of Canada.[97] It is a perspective that has been shared by other scholars who have interpreted Quebec political thought.[98]

Quebec theorists such as Leon Dion have asserted that both Quebec and Canada participate within the Western liberal experience.[99] That approach has been supported by political experience, as well as normative scholarship.[100] This participation makes it possible to explore the uniqueness of Canada within a broader philosophical model. This model could allow the examination of theoretical differences between Canada and Quebec, as well as regional differences within Anglophone Canada, without treating the different segments as being alien to each other. All of them appear to experience the conflict of individualist and collectivist values that fits within the "dialectical" construct that has been suggested. This approach may undermine the traditional perspective of Canada/Quebec relations or it may compel an adjustment of that traditional method of evaluation. The latter possibility could prove to be useful for the purpose of advancing and achieving a more meaningful appreciation of this relationship, as well as other Canadian sources of political and social friction that have implications within the realm of political thought.

Conclusion

The argument for the development and application of *a* "grand theory" should precede a proposition of *the* grand theory of Canadian political thought. While a dichotomy based upon a competition between liberal and communitarian traditions of liberal democratic ideology is a plausible example, the definitive establishment of that thesis as the basis for such a grand theory of Canadian political thought will require a further, and much more detailed, analysis that is certain to be countered with objections and alternative theories. But first, it is necessary to establish the desirability of approaching this subject in a more structured and consistent manner than it generally has been to date.

Therefore, the purpose of this essay primarily has been to indicate that Canadian political thought will benefit from the imposition of a broad analytical model that could provide common points of reference in the examination of ideological difference and development within that country. Such a model could treat Canadian ideological history as a parallel development of tendencies and aspirations. These tendencies and aspirations could

include broadly collective and majoritarian objectives, on the one hand, and individualistic objectives, on the other hand. The model could be used to contrast classic liberal thought with communitarian thought and Quebec reform liberalism with ultramontantism, including a strain that can be traced to a historical interpretation of New France and the origins of French-Canadian nationalism.[101] It also could be used to contrast traditional liberal economic thought with socialist and social democratic movements. For example, the communitarianism of Vernon Van Dycke[102] and the more libertarian thought of Henry Mayo[103] can be contrasted in this way. Also, the conflict between the Quebec nationalism of Marcel Rioux[104] and Pierre Trudeau's liberal denunciation of that movement[105] can be contrasted in this way.

Other sectors of Canadian society also could be embraced by this approach. Indeed, contributions to the philosophical development of Canada that have been sorely marginalized or overlooked could be provided more deserving attention through such an approach. The contributions of the First Nations, in this respect, have been underappreciated (including within this essay) and a grand theory might be a good vehicle for emphasizing their importance to the overall development of Canadian thought, political and otherwise.[106] More specific analyses derived from the influence of gender and class (also often marginalized or overlooked) also ought to be included within this wider approach, including the contributions of Canadian feminist and Marxist scholars[107] as well as classic treatments in disciplines such as Canadian political economy.[108] Again, the rectification of such oversights would be best addressed through the establishment of grand theory as an approach, prior to advancing specific theories emanating from that approach.

Likewise, competition between economic protectionism and free trade reciprocity can be given a more critical theoretical focus through the application of such a normative analytical frame. Controversies involving constitutional challenges, such as the rejection of collective rights claims by some jurists in favor of individual rights claims, can be explored through the use of this model. Discussions about the appropriate role of the government in providing social services (including healthcare) can fall under this analysis. Indeed, contrasting interpretations of the Canada Constitution Acts that include both individual civil rights and the protection of broad social objectives (such as language policy, multiculturalism, and affirmative action) can be understood as an accommodation of these different the variations of Canadian political thought. Other Canadian political issues (including federalism and foreign policy) also may benefit from such an analysis.

Indeed, any study of political thought within Western societies may benefit from such a framework. But for Canada, it may prove to be especially useful because it can provide a normative tool for further analysis and, at the very least, offer more consistency and coherence for the application of a foundational field of Canadian political science. Political thought often is under-appreciated, or even denigrated, by political practitioners and scholars (including some political scientists) in comparison with more empirically satisfying approaches to political and social analysis. Political philosophy often is treated, likewise, as a marginal humanist contribution to public policy. Yet, an understanding of these ideas is crucial for achieving a thorough appreciation of a polity, especially one that is as preoccupied with the theme of "identity" as Canada. The development of a normative model of political thought (whether identified as a "grand theory" or not) can contribute appreciably towards an improved understanding of all practical and policy issues. Therefore, that model can, ultimately, reinforce the importance of Canadian political thought as a component of an overall study of Canadian nationalism, in particular, and Canadian politics and government in general.

Notes

1. The terms "liberal" and "republican" refer to established ideological traditions and not to current colloquial uses or political parties.
2. Quentin Skinner, *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Howard Wiarda, *Grand Theories and Ideologies in the Social Sciences.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
3. Ray Nichols, "'Maxims,' Practical Wisdom, and the Language of Action: Beyond Grand Theory," 24 *Political Theory,* No. 4 (November 1996), pp. 687–705. Two examples that have been subject to particular scrutiny in this respect are Daniel Bell and Francis Fukuyama. Critiques of their perceived shortcomings in applying grand theory to political science include Yuezhi Zhao, "The 'End of Ideology,' Again? The Concept of ideology in the Era of Post-Modern Theory," 18 *Canadian Journal of Sociology,* No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 70–71; Gregory B. Smith, "The End of history or a Portal to the Future: Does Anything Lie Beyond Late Modernity?" in *After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics,* Timothy Burns, ed. Lanham, MD: Lanham Publishers, 1994, pp. 1–21.
4. Jurgen Habermas, "Questions and Counter-Questions," in *Habermas and Modernity,* Richard J. Bernstein, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985, pp. 192–216; Michael Dummett, "Can Analytical Philosophy Be Systematic, and Ought It to Be?" in *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?* Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 185–216.
5. Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964), Seymour Martin Lipset, *Continental Divide* (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 1–18, 42–56; Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," 32 *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (May 1966), pp. 143–171, Kenneth McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," in *The Founding of New Societies*, Louis Hartz, ed. (Harcourt, Brace, and World: New York, 1964), pp. 219–234, Denis Monière, *Le Devéloppment des idéologies au Québec* (Montréal: Editions Québec-Amérique, 1977).
6. George Grant, Lament for a Nation (Montreal and Kington, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).
7. For example, Conrad Winn and James Twiss, "The Spatial Analysis of Political Cleavages and the Case of the Ontario Legislature," 10 *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, No. 2 (June 1977), pp. 287–310; Tom Truman, "A Scale for Measuring a Tory Streak in Canada and the United States," 10 *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (1977), pp. 597–614; Rod Preece, "The Myth of the Red Tory," 1 *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* (1977), pp. 3–28; Gad Horowitz, "The 'Myth' of the Red Tory," 1 *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* (1977), pp. 87–88; Roger Gibbins and Neil Nevitte, "Canadian Political Ideology: A Comparative Analysis," 18 *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, No. 3 (September 1985), pp. 577–598; John Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures: Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System," 7 *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, No. 3 (September 1974), pp. 438–483, Peter J. Smith, "The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation," 22 *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (1987), pp. 6–9, and Robert Finbow, "Ideology and Institutions in North America," 26 *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 671–697.
8. Thoughtful overviews regarding this relative neglect in the area of Canadian political thought is offered in Janet Ajzenstat, "Doing Canadian Political Thought," 26 *Journal of Canadian Studies*, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 5–6, and Peter Smith, "Some Observations on the Revival of Canadian Political Thought," 26 *Journal of Canadian Studies*, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 3–6.
9. For example, Robert Meynell, *Canadian Idealism and the Philosophy of Freedom: C. B. Macpherson,* George Grant, and Charles Taylor. Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011; Jerome Bickenback, *Canadian Cases in the Philosophy of Law.* New York: Broadview Press, 2006; Philip Massolin, *Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge of Modernity.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001; Neil Nevitte and Roger Gibbins, "Neoconservatism: Canadian Variations on an Ideological Theme?" 10 *Canadian Public Policy,* No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 384–394.
10. For example, Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, eds. *Canadian Political Philosophy: Contemporary Reflections.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; Stephen Brooks, ed., *Political Thought in Canada.* Toronto: Irwin, 1984; H. D. Forbes, *Canadian Political Thought.*

Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985; Katherine Fierlbeck, *The Development of Political Thought in Canada.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005; Andrew D. Irvine and John S. Russell, eds., *In the Agora: The Public Face of Canadian Philosophy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006; George Blain Baker and J. Phillips, eds., *A History of Canadian Legal Thought*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006; Michael Ornstein and H. Michael Stevenson, *Politics and Ideology in Canada.* Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999.

11. For example, James Bickerton, Stephen Brooks, and Alain G. Gagnon, *Freedom, Equality, Community: The Political Philosophy of Six Influential Canadians.* Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007; G. de T. Glazenbrook, *A History of Canadian Political Thought.* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966; Thomas A Goudge, "A Century of Philosophy in English Speaking Canada," 47 *Dalhousie Review,* No. 4; John A. Iriving, *Philosophy in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952; Charles De Koninck, *La Philosophie au Canada de langue francaise*. Ottawa: Royal Commission Studies, 1951.
12. One exception is Robert Meynall, who has noted that the analysis of Canadian political thinkers has portrayed them as "isolated thinkers," *Canadian Idealism and the Philosophy of Freedom* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), pp. 3–13. Another exception is the claim that scholars in this field "have felt compelled to speak or write about the nature of their subdiscipline," A. B. McKillop, *Contours of Canadian Thought*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, p. 24.
13. G. B. Madison, Paul Fairfield, and Ingrid Harris*, Is There a Canadian Philosophy? Reflections on the Canadian Identity* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2000), p. 3.
14. This problem has been identified in a critique of the "two nations" theory of Canadian political culture in John Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures: Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System," 7 *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* No. 3 (September 1974), pp. 438–441.
15. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government,* Peter Laslett, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty,* Stefan Collini, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat social,* Gérard Mairet, ed. Paris: Poche, 1996; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Allen W. Wood, ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
16. C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; John Rawls, *Political Liberalism.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2005; Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue.* South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007; Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
17. John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1965), especially regarding his assessment of democratic values and their true place within Canadian society, pp. 533–557.
18. A classic example of this approach is Walter Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power* (McClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1975).
19. A good assessment of the approaches to this sort of study can be found in David Bell, "Political Culture in Canada," in *Canadian Politics in the 1980s*, Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, eds. (Methuen: Agincourt, ON, 1984), pp. 155–174.
20. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition,* Amy Gutmann, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 59–60.
21. Charles Taylor, "The Dynamics of Democratic Exclusion," 9 Journal of Democracy, No. 4 (October 1998), p. 154.
22. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition." p. 39.
23. Charles Taylor, "Can Liberalism Be Communitarian?" 8 *Critical Review,* No. 2 (Spring 1994) a
24. Will Kymlicka, "Individual and Community Rights," in *Group Rights,* Judith Baker, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 2–3.
25. Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality," in *Communitarianism and Individualism,* Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 177–183.

26. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 177–183.
27. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 1.
28. G.B. Madison, Paul Fairfield, and Ingrid Harris, *Is There a Canadian Philosophy?* Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2000, p. 3.
29. C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 1–8; Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited,* part II. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987, pp. 367–398.
30. Arash Abizadeh, "Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments," 96 *American Political Science Review,* No. 3 (September 2002), pp. 495–509; Albert W. Dzur, "Nationalism, Liberalism, and Democracy," 55 *Political Research Quarterly,* No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 191–211; David Miller, *Market, State, and Community.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 236–241.
31. Stephen Brooks, *Canadian Democracy: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 9–14.
32. One analysis that has come close to making a similar claim (though by appealing to competing liberal and republican political values within a particular historical context) is Peter J. Smith, "The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation," 20 *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* No. 1 (March 1985), pp. 3–29.
33. Raoul Berger, *Government by Judiciary* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1977), pp. 1–10. An equally good critique of this approach can be found in Michael Perry, *The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights* (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1982), pp. 7–36.
34. John C. Miller, *Origins of the American Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 3–37.
35. Kenneth Dolbeare, *American Political Thought.* Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009, pp. xxiv, 5–10.
36. Carl L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence.* New York: Bibliobazzar, 2010, pp. 64–79; Edward S. Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," 42 *Harvard Law Review*, No. 3 (January 1929), pp. 383–406; Merle Curti, "The Great Mr. Locke, America's Philosopher," 11 *Huntington Library Bulletin* (1939); Vernon L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought,* vol. I (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.
37. Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967; Gordon Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969.
38. John Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," in *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives,* John W. Yolton, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 45–80; Thomas L. Pangle, *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988; J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
39. Steven M. Dworetz, *The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990; John Perry, *The Pretenses of Loyalty: Locke, Liberal Theory, and American Political Theology.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
40. Nicholas Abercrombie and Bryan S. Turner, "The Dominant Ideology Thesis," 29 *British Journal of Sociology,* No. 2 (June 1978), 149.
41. Margaret S. Archer, *Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 1–24.
42. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (Harcourt, Brace and World: New York, 1991.
43. An annoying and, frequently, confusing problem in these sorts of studies is the distinction (or lack of a distinction) between the ideological concepts of "liberal" (particularly in terms of its "classic" description as generally traced to the writings of John Locke) and "libertarian." The distinction, if it exists, is likely to be a subtle, a virtually indistinguishable, or, even, a semantic one that is beyond the immediate scope of this analysis, which will use the terms "liberal" or "classic liberal" as a label for this Lockean tradition. One attempt to address this

distinction is provided in William E. Hudson, *The Libertarian Illusion.* Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007, pp. 13–14.

44. Kenneth D. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," in *The Founding of New Societies*, Louis Hartz, ed. (Harcourt, Brace, and World: New York, 1964), pp. 219–234.
45. Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics*. University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1968, pp. 29–44.
46. Rod Preece, "The Anglo-Saxon Conservative Tradition," 13 *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 3–11.
47. George Grant, *Lament for a Nation* (McClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1970), pp. 68–87.
48. Edmund Burke, *Burke's Politics: Selected Writings and Speeches,* R. Hoffman and P. Leyack, eds. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949; Joseph de Maistre, *Contre Rousseau: De l'etat de nature.* Paris: Fayard/Mille et une nuits, 2008.
49. Michael Oakshott, *On Human Conduct.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1991; Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
50. For example, Gregory A. Huber and Thomas J. Espenshade, "Neo-Isolationism, Balanced-Budget Conservatism, and the Fiscal Impacts of Immigrants," 31 *International Migration Review,* No. 4 (Winter 1997), 1031.
51. Horowitz, pp. 33–35.
52. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution* (Basic Books: New York, 1968), pp. 12–44.
53. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Canada and the United States: The Cultural Dimension," in *Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress* (Prentice-Hall, NJ: Englewood Cliffs, 1985), pp. 109–160.
54. As also used to describe the role of rights in relation to the broader legal and political system, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 90–94.
55. Pierre Birnbaum and Tracy B. Strong, "From Multiculturalism to Nationalism," 24 *Political Theory,* No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 38–41; Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes. Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005, pp. 187–201; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Historical Traditions and National Characteristics: A Comparative Analysis of Canada and the United States," 11 *Canadian Journal of Sociology,* No. 2 (Summer 1986), pp. 142–146.
56. Candace Johnson Redden, "Health as Citizenship Narrative," 34 *Polity*, No. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 356–357, 366–367, 370; Christopher Manfredi, *Judicial Power and the Charter* (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 15–17; David Clark, "Neoliberalism and Public Service Reform: Canada in Comparative Perspective," 35 *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 790–792.
57. Patrick Monahan, *Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism, and the Supreme Court of Canada.* Toronto: Carswell, 1987, pp. 91–129; David J. Elkins, "Facing Our Destiny: Rights and Canadian Distinctiveness," 22 *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* No. 4 (June 1989), pp. 702–705; Paul M. Sniderman, Joseph F. Fletcher, Peter H. Russell, and Philip E. Tetlock, "Political Culture and the Problem of Double Standards: Mass and Elite Attitudes Toward Language Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," 22 *Canadian Journal of Rights and Freedoms,* No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 259–263; Christopher P. Manfredi, "The Canadian Supreme Court and American Judicial Review: United States Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," 40 *American Journal of Comparative Law,* No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 213–214, 219–220; F. L. Morton, "The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," 20 *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* No. 1 (March 1987), pp. 39–45.
58. This quote has been most commonly ascribed to Prime Minister Joe Clark in reference to his vision of a decentralized Canadian federalism in *Who Speaks for Canada? Words that Shape a Country,* Desmond Morton and Morton Weinfeld, eds. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1998, p. 284.
59. Charles Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity, and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada," in *Constitutionalism, Citizenship, and Society in Canada*, Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams, eds. (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1985), pp. 183–229; Avigail I. Eisenberg, *Reconstructing Political Pluralism* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 9–22.

60. Allen Buchanan, "The Role of Collective Rights in the Theory of Indigenous Peoples' Rights," 89 *Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems*, No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 89–108, J. Angelo Corlett, "The Problem of Collective Moral Rights," 7 *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence*, No. 2 (July 1994), pp. 237–259, Will Kymlicka, "Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity," 4 *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence*, No. 2 (July 1991), pp. 239–256, and Leslie R. Shapard, "Group Rights," 4 *Public Affairs Quarterly*, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 299–308.
61. Evelyn Kallen, "The Meech Lake Accord: Entrenching a Pecking Order of Minority Rights," 14 Canadian Public Policy, supplemental issue (September 1988), pp. S110–S111, S114, S116–S118.
62. Lorraine E. Weinrib, "'This New Democracy': Justice Iacobucci and Canada's rights Revolution," 57 *University of Toronto Law Journal,* No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 411–412.
63. Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, "The Effects of the Canadian Supreme Court's Charter Interpretation on Regional and Intergovernmental Tensions in Canada," 26 *Publius*, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 86, 89–90.
64. Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds., *Ethnicity and Group Rights.* New York: New York University Press, 2000, p. 4.
65. Donald J.C. Carmichael, Thomas C. Pocklington, and Gregory E. Prycz, *Democracy and Rights in Canada* (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1991), pp. 1–19.
66. James T. McHugh, "Collective Rights in Quebec," 3 *Southern Journal of Canadian Studies*, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 1–16.
67. M. James Penton, "Collective versus Individual Rights: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," in *The U.S. Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, William R. McKercher, ed. (Toronto: Ontario Economic Counci, 1983), pp. 179–182. They are given fuller treatment in McHugh, pp. 1–16.
68. William Christian and Colin Campbell, *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada* (Toronot: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983), pp. 45–51.
69. David M. Beatty, *Putting the Charter to Work* (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's Press, 1987), pp. 116–132.
70. F.D. Forbes, "Hartz-Horowitz at Twenty," 20 *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, No. 2 (summer 1987), pp. 292–296.
71. This theme permeates, for example, many historical sources, especially earlier ones, such as W.L. Morton, *The Canadian Identity* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961).
72. For example, many historians have asserted, traditionally, that the settlement of Upper Canada, as spurred by United Empire Loyalists, introduced an essentially "conservative" dynamic to Canada's historical development, including J.B. Brebner, *Canada: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 105–108. However, other historians have been more critical of that assumption, such as W.L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada* (Toronot: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 174–176. More recent historical analysis has recognized the more complex cultural and philosophical foundation of that evolution. An excellent example of this approach is W.G. Shelton, "The United Empire Loyalists: A Reconsideration," in *Readings in Canadian History: Preconfederation*, R. Douglas Francis and Donald B. Smith, eds. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1990), pp. 234–243. Motivations and patterns of settlement and economic development within Upper Canada and, later, Ontario, suggest this same complexity, R. Cole Harris and John Warkentin, *Canada Before Confederation* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1974), pp. 110–166.
73. The classic expression of this perspective provides the basis for the seminal philosophical work, John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1984). An excellent critique of this principle and its application to modern liberal democracies, such as Canada, is C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 25–37. An application of the harm principle to government from a Canadian perspective is offered in Alan Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics," 4 *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, No. 3 (September 1971), pp. 301–345.
74. An assessment of this clause and its constitutional and political significance can be found in Peter Hogg, *Constitutional Law of Canada* (Carswell: Toronto, 1985), pp. 12–20.
75. An evaluation of these French constitutional values and the historical and ideological context in which they were created (including their conventional relationship to liberal democratic

thought, in general) is offered in Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 18–25.

76. Gary Wills, *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 167–255.
77. C.B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955), pp. 3–28.
78. Max Wyman, "Tomorrow's Rights in the Mirror of History," in *Civil Liberties in Canada*, Gerald L. Gall, ed. (Toronto: Buttersworth, 1982), pp. 26–50.
79. This pattern is explored in Christina McCall Newman, *Grits* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1982).
80. This broad theme is addressed in Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), pp. 3–20.
81. George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (London: Paladin, 1970).
82. A summary of these tendencies within the French polity is provided in Philip G. Cerny, "The Political Balance," in *French Politics and Public Policy*, Philip G. Cerny and Martin A. Schain, eds. (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), pp. 1–21.
83. This relationship can be assessed by evaluating works such as J.W.T. Mason, *The Meaning of Shinto* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1975), and comparing it with specific examples of Japanese political values, such as provided in Yosiyuki Noda, *Introduction to Japanese Law* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980), especially pp. 190–224.
84. For example, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat social* (Paris: G.F. Flammarion, 1992), pp. 29–50. A critical evaluation of this perspective is provided in Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Peter Gay, trans. and ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
85. Good examples of this nationalist perspective in Canada are provided in Carl Berger, "The True North Strong and Free," in *Nationalism in Canada*, Peter Russell, ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 3–26, John Meisel, "Escaping Extinction: Cultural Defence of an Undefended Border," in *Southern Exposure: Canadian Perspectives on the United States,* D.H. Flaherty and W.R. McKercher, eds. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986), pp. 152–168, and Mildred A. Schwartz, *Public Opinion and Canadian Identity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 106–118.
86. This point is eloquently made in Dennis Summara, Brent Davis, and Linda Laidlaw, "Canadian Identity and Curriculum Theory: An Ecological, Postmodern Perspective," 26 *Canadian Journal of Education,* No. 2 (2001), pp. 147–148.
87. This approach to Canadian national identity has been a conspicuous one. Political concerns regarding it have been raised in Marc Lalonde, "Quebec and Canada: A Union Worth Preserving" (Ottawa: Canadian Unity Information Office, 1977), pp. 10–12, and Robert L. Stanfield, "Nationalism: A Canadian Dilemma?" (Ottawa: Canadian Unity Information Office, 1978), pp. 9–11.Scholarly assessments of this trend in Canadian national identity include Blair Fraser, *The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945–1967* (Doubleday: Garden City, NY, 1967), pp. 301–308, David M. Potter, "Canadian Views of the United States as a Reflex of Canadian Values: A Commentary," in *Canada Views the United States*, S.F. Wise and R.C. Brown, eds. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 126–131, and Frank Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 221–226.
88. E. R. Black, *Divided Loyalties: Canadian Concepts of Federalism* (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), pp. 3–7.
89. Georg Wilhelm Friedreich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, J. Sibree, trans. (New York: Wiley, 1944), pp. 20–37. An excellent critical evaluation of Hegel's method and approach is provided in Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 389–427. A criticism of Hartz for failing to adapt a Hegelian dialectic as part of his ovreall fragment theory is provided in Walter C. Soderlund, Ralph C. Nelson, and Ronald H. Wagenberg, "A Critique of the Hartz Theory of Political Development as Applied to Canada," 12 *Comparative Politics,* No. 1 (October 1979), p. 64.
90. An interesting assessment of the possible applications of this method beyond Hegel's philosophical construct is provided in R.P. Singh, "From Dialogue to Dialectic: Socrates, Kant, and Hegel," 29 *Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, No. 1 (1990), pp. 32–39.
91. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Avon: New York, 1993), pp. 39–51.
92. This interpretation is suggested in Raymond Breton, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building," in *The Politics of Gender and Language in Canada*, Alan C. Cairns and Cynthia

Williams, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press o, 1986), pp. 50–54, Samuel V. Laselva, *The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes, Achievements, and Tragedies of Natonhood.* Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996, pp. 11–21, and Peter Woolfson, "An Anthropological Perspective: The Ingredients of a Multicultural Society," in *Understanding Canada*, William Metcalfe, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 389–393. The perceived conflict between libertarian and communitarian interpretations of Canadian liberal democratic values as experienced through the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is addressed in Alan C. Cairns, *Charter versus Federalism* (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp. 22–27, and M. James Penton, "Collective versus Individual Rights: The Canadian Tradition and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms," in *The U.S. Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, William R. McKercher, ed. (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1983), pp. 179–184.

93. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat social et autres oeuvres politiques*, Jean Ehrard, ed. (Paris: Editions Garnier Frères, 1975), pp. 233–237; Jacques Dufresne, *Le Courage et la lucidité: essai sur la constitution d'un Québec souverain* (Sillery, QC: Septentrion, 1990), pp. 170–173; Claude-Jean Galipeau, "National Minorites, Rights, and Signs: The Supreme Court and Language Legislation in Quebec," in *Democracy with Justice*, Alain-G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, eds. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), pp. 74–75.
94. Christopher Hodson, *The Canadian Diaspora: An Eighteenth-Century History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 6–7, 50–51, 198–199.
95. Daniel Latouche, "La Vrai nature de la revolution tranquille," 7 *Revue canadienne de science politique*, No. 3 (September 1974), pp. 525–526.
96. Denis Monière, *Le Développement des idéologies au Québec* (Editions Québec/Amérique: Montréal, 1977), pp. 38–41, 170–182.
97. This perspective once was accepted widely, but it has been strongly challenged by more recent scholarship. The classic exponent of this theoretical interpretation of Quebec society is McRae, pp. 219–234. Scholarship that continues to accept that theoretical approach include Sheila Arnopolous and Dominique Clift, *The English Fact in Quebec* (McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal and Kingston, 1984), pp. 35–40.
98. Good examples of this scholarship include Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution* (McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal and Kingston, 1986), pp. 8–19, and Fernand Dumont, *Idéologies au Canada français*, 1930–1939 (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1978), pp. 1–20.
99. Leon Dion, *A la Recherche du Québec* (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Univerisitê Laval, 1987), pp. 8–17.
100. Quebec's true ideological heritage was revealed following the end of its long era of political corruption and the implementation of liberal and social democratic reforms that were initiated during "la revolution tranquille" and which characterize modern Quebec politics, as noted in Herbert F. Quinn, *L'Union Nationale* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 3–10, and Dale Thomson, *Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 3–18.
101. Lionel Groulx, *Notre grande aventure* (Montréal: Fides, 1976); Gérard Bouchard, *Les Deux chanoines: contradiction et ambivalence dans la pensée de Lionel Groulx* (Montréal: Boréal, 2003), pp. 1–18.
102. Vernon Van Dycke, "Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal Democratic Thought," 44 *The Journal of Politics*, No. 1 (1982), pp. 21–48.
103. Henry Mayo, *An Introduction to Democratic Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).
104. Marcel Rioux, *La Question du Québec* (Montréal: Parti Pris, 1976).
105. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, *Le federalisme et les canadiens français* (Montréal: La Presse de l'Université de Montréal, 1966).
106. These contributions include Annis May Timpson, ed., *First Nations, First Thoughts: The Impact of Indigenous Thought in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), Margaret Elizabth Kovach, *Indigenous Methodologies: Characteristics, Conversations, and Conexts* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), John Borrows, *Drawing Out Law* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), and John Borrows, *Canada's Indigenous Constitution* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).

107. Such contributions could include Roberta Hamilton, *Gendering the Vertical Mosaic: Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Society* (Toronto: Pearson, 2004), Joan Sangster, *Through Feminist Eyes: Essays on Canadian Women's History* (Athabasca, AB: Athabasca University Press, 2011), Frank Cunningham, *Understanding Marxism: A Canadian Introduction* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1981), and Peter Campbell, *Canadian Marxists and the Search for a Third Way* (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000).
108. This literature includes such prominent texts as Harold A. Innis, *The Fir Trade in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, *The State in Capitalist Society* (London: Merlin Press, 2009), and Wallace Clement, *Understanding Canada: Building on the New Canadian Political Economy* (Montreal and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).

Notes on contributor

James T. McHugh is Professor of Political Science and a Fellow of the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron. He has written widely on Canadian and Quebec politics and related fields.